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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CONSTRUCTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISION FOR SALE OF LAND FOR SCHOOL FUND - RIGHT OF RE-
DEMPTION RESTRICTED.-Land sold at sheriff's sale in 1928 for non-
payment of 1926 taxes was purchased by the state. In 1946 the
state filed a bill in equity to sell the land for the school fund. The
1941 statute provided: "The former owner of any real estate pur-
chased by the state may redeem at any time until such real estate
has been sold as provided in article four of this chapter." W. VA.
CODE (Michie. 1943) c. 11-A. alt. 3, § 8. Before 1941 the statutory
period of redemption was one year after the sheriff's sale. W. VA.
1kFV. CODE (1931) c. 11, art. 10. § 30 The court dismissed the
state's bill. Held, affirmed. Under this 1941 change in the act, the
land had not "become irredeemable" within the meaning of W. VA.
CONST. Art XIII, § 4. State v. Farmers Coal Co., 43 S. E. (2d) 625.
(1947).
The constitutional section in question, which is the foundation
of our tax delinquency laws, reads as follows: "All lands - for any
cause forfeited ... or escheated to Virginia or this State, or par-
chased by either and become irredeemable, not redeemed, released,
transferred, or otherwise disposed of, shall by proceedings in the
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circuit court of the county in which the lands, or a part thereof, are
situated, be sold to the highest bidder." (Italics supplied.) This
indefinite language has given rise to West Virginia's impractical
and indigenous double sale system of dealing with land delinquent
for nonpayment of taxes. It is first sold by the sheriff, who must
bid it in for the state if no other bid equals the amount of the taxes.
If purchased by the state, the land must be sold again, this time by
solemn court proceedings. W. VA. R[EV. CODE (1931) c. 11, art. 10,
and c. 37, art. 3. The constitution is obscure about matter of redemp-
tion; it is not explicit that there must be a right of redemption, nor
does it prescribe when such right may or may not occur. Yet, under
the instant case it may be summarized as follows: There must be a
right of redemption for a definite length of time after the first sale;
if the state is the purchaser at that sale, there must intervene, be-
tween the expiration of the redemption period and the institution of
proceedings for the second sale, a lapse of time during which there
can be absolutely no redemption; then, during the proceedings in
court, the legislature may, as a matter of grace, grant the privilege of
r edemption, which cannot extend beyond the confirmation of sale. In
1947, the legislature, by amending the statute has conformed to this
judicial interpretation. W. VA. CODE (Mlichie, 1943) c. 11A, art. 3,
§ 8, and art. 4. It is fundamental that a statute should not be de-
clared unconstitutional unless absolutely necessary. Staie v. Condi,
103 W. Va. 23, 136 S. E. 505 (1927). There are several ways the
court might have saved the statute from abrogation. Firstly, who is
there to complain of its operation? In State ex rel. Dillon v. County
Court, 60 NV. Va. 339. 353, 55 S. E. 382, 388 (1906), the court quotes
from Speer v. Commonwealth, 23 Gratt. 935, 938 (Va. 1873) : "It
is well settled that a statute must be assumed to be constitutional
and valid, until some one complains, whose rights it invades." In
Belhosser v. Iaeger, 112 W. Va. 598, 600, 166 S. E. 10, 11 (1932), the
court said: "Is the town in a position to question the constitution-
ality of the statute? It was the party benefited... The constitution-
ality of a statute may not be attacked by one whose rights are not af-
fected by the operation of the statute." In the instant case, the
former owner claimed no injury and apparently suffered none, the
statute being lenient toward him in redemption favor. Secondly, in
construing the pre-1941 statutory law, the court held the land be-
comes irredeemable within the meaning of the constitution after the
expiration of one year allowed for redemption after the sheriff's
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sale. State v. Board, 111 W. Va. 562, 16.3 S. E. 57 (1932). Though the
land was characterized as irredeemable, the former owner had one
later opportunity to redeem, redemption being allowed during the
pendency of the suit for the second sale. W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c.
37, art. 3, § 29. The court declared that this second period of re-
demption is a mere matter of grace on the part of the legislature
without effect on the irredeemable status of the land. Bank of Qui-
niwood v. Becker, 119 W. Va. 534, 194 S. E. 894 (1937). Also,
statutes extending the time allowed for redemption are constitution-
al, the extension being a legislative privilege that does not affect the
irredeemable quality of the land. Blooming Rose Coal Co. v. White,
37 S. B. (2d) 455 (W. Va. 1946). The same line of reasoning would
have sustained the statute in question. Thirdly, in point of fact. the
lands in the main case could not have been redeemed from 1929 until
1932 nor from 1939 until 1941. W. VA. CODE (Barnes, 1923) c. 31.
§ 33; IV. Va. Acts 1939, c. 61. This would seem sufficient to sat-
isfy any technical requirement of irredeemability. Finally, the
court might have employed the technique it recently used in Law-
head v. County Court, 38 S. E. (2d) 897 (W. Va. 1946). There the
court went beyond the so-called plain meaning of the words to apply
their practical and rational meaning. The instant case turns upon
refinement of syntax rather than reason. Under it, had the statute
allowed one week, or even a day, during which there could be no re-
demption, it would have been valid. Such reasoning is hypercritical.
The constitution exhibits no purpose to restrict the legislature in the
matter of redemption; instead, its silence in this respect indicates,
and the court might have held, it was a matter whose details were
for the legislature. The decision flies in the face of the principle of
deciding constitutional doubts in favor of statutory validity.
R. G. S.
CRIMIIN-1L LA--KEEPING PLACE OF PROSTITUTION-CIRCUMI-
STANTIAL EVIDENCE OF Corpus Delicti. - As X, an undercover man,
walked by the house occupied by D and two other women, he was ac-
costed by D and asked to come in for the purpose of prostitution with
cne of the women. He inquired as to the price and was told that it
would be "all right". X then excused himself on a pretense and
left. Approximately two weeks later the house was raided and the
same two women, who were present when D solicited X, were arrest-
ed along with D. The evidence showed That D had a past record as
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